Introduction: Forgetting shapes learning in two different ways. It impedes learning when
| INTRODUCTION
We should learn from the past. To not do so is to waste opportunity and resource on failed strategies and practices. This is the fundamental proposition for building a learning health system (LHS)-to harness the treasure trove of clinical data stored in electronic health records (EHRs) so that every patient's experience adds to the knowledge base, [1] [2] [3] and every new patient's care is as effective as we can make it. 4 Beyond questions of diagnosis and treatment, an LHS should focus on improving the quality, safety, and effectiveness of health care
processes. 5 There is little point in discovering the best way to treat a patient, if poor execution leads to unnecessary harm, cost, or suffering.
Yet today health care services everywhere still struggle with quality and safety challenges, despite a decade of intense focus on the problem. 6 There is too much variation in patient care, and too much waste and harm in the system.
| QUESTIONS OF INTEREST
"Forgetting" is the complement of learning; and in this paper, I explore two different roles that forgetting can take in the LHS. First, much of the data and knowledge that is needed to address questions of quality and safety is today forgotten, and will likely never be captured just in
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Secondly, forgetting is not always negative. It is just as important to engineer ways of forgetting obsolete practices in an LHS, as it is to discover new ones. Coming to grips with these two aspects of a forgetting health system are likely to be major challenges in bringing forth the truly adaptive, self-optimizing health care systems of the future.
3 | DISCUSSION
| Process information is lost
Quality and safety are ultimately process-centric properties of a system. They are shaped both by system defences that constrain unsafe actions, and system affordances that give latitude to actions that may come with risk. If we are to build learning systems that minimise patient risk, then it will be necessary to measure process execution.
The state of the art in quality and safety measurement, however, significantly lags our ability to measure patient outcomes. Critical incident reports, for example, capture only a small proportion of adverse outcomes, are not representative of true event frequencies, and are not available in real time. 7 There are emerging digital technologies that trigger alerts when certain high-risk actions occur, such as repeat orders for a medication within a short time window. 8 In general, however, we still do not necessarily know which processes of service delivery should be instrumented nor which events are the most important to flag.
As a result, much process data still sit in the heads of those who work within an organization. 9 The nuances of what was done, when it was done, and why the execution of events was in one sequence and not another stay on the shop floor. There is a significant difference between work as imagined (for example, in a documented treatment plan) and work as done (the real-time execution of that plan). 10 Responding to the evolving logic of events in the physical world, clinicians must find ways of satisfying multiple competing demands and will not always be able to reconcile what is recommended practice with what could or should be done.
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Creating a learning health service that can optimise process execution would require concerted effort to "instrument the enterprise" and capture service information at a number of levels:
• 
| Learning in complex systems also requires forgetting
In patient safety, there has been a dawning recognition that creating safe systems cannot rely simply on focusing on what goes wrong (Safety 1) but that there also needs to be attention to what goes right (Safety 2). 10 We probably need to see a similar change in framing for therapy. Collectively, these processes try to identify "low-value care"-practices that are not supported by economic measures of value. [19] [20] [21] Decommissioning is usually a top-down intervention, involving change-management strategies such as community engagement, and the use of champions.
Standardisation also seeks to eliminate "unwarranted" local variation. 22 Whilst standardisation clearly has an important role, it poses a challenge to the LHS, because its intent is to suppress local adaptation, yet creating variation is the whole point of the LHS. 23 Another well-known challenge to standardisation is that not everything is a good target for homogenisation. It is no doubt a good thing for computer systems to share a standard way to describe data or to construct messages. This system inertia-the resistance of a system to change despite clear evidence that change is essential-is an emergent property of the structure of health services, and is likely a function of system complexity. 26 Put simply, the more dependencies there are in a system, the harder it is in general to change behavior. Further, complexity grows over time, as we accrete new practices but do not entirely abandoning the old. One solution to growth in complexity and inertia is to actively reduce system complexity, freeing up the system to flex and adapt.
Discovering mechanisms to overcome system inertia through complexity reduction thus becomes a foundational challenge in the construction of any LHS.
Local variations thus have the tendency to accrete over time and add to system complexity. They can persist in the processes, protocols and built structures of an organization, and in the workarounds, customizations, and annotations that happen to physical spaces. 27 Important lessons are thus embedded in the physical structure of the organization, and the physics of the way people act within that structure. With time, the canvas of a new organization is overlaid with accreted experience, lessons learned, and adaptations directly embedded into workflow. These structural memories are not inert, passive, or idly awaiting analysis. Rather, they sit there every moment-shaping work, constraining behavior, and altering human perceptions, actions, and intent. The task of forgetting old practices is thus non-trivial, as many are never documented or described, but simply become part of the fabric of work.
| Programmed cell death as a model for the forgetting health system
How one approaches mindful forgetting in health systems remains little explored. Whilst we have blunt top-down strategies like standardisation or decommissioning, there are no obvious complementary bottom-up processes that remove unwanted local variations whilst preserving what is important. Equally, there is much still to be learned about the best way to implement these mechanisms so that no harm is done in the process.
Biology may be able to help, as it has provided organizational science many metaphors and insights over the years, some more powerful than others. 28, 29 Biological processes can also provide us with a set of mechanisms that parallel the organizational challenge of forgetting the unwanted and simplifying the complex. Specifically, programmed cell death (PCD) has exactly these roles in the organism. 26 It targets cells that require removal because they are no longer functioning well-for example, in the removal of precancerous cells. The PCD is also crucial in homeostasis. In embryogenesis or organism development, PCD helps craft organ structure by shaping which cells should continue to grow and which must die-for example, creating the spaces between fingers. The biology of cell death is complex and includes at least three different mechanisms of apoptosis, 30 necrosis, and autophagy. 31, 32 From the point of view of organizational development and function, the specific molecular mechanisms of cell death are probably of less interest than the functional design of these different death pathways. What is of interest is that PCD is adaptive to circumstances, can work from bottom up to top down, and has evolved sophisticated machinery to minimise unnecessary harm to healthy parts of the organism-all very desirable properties for the LHS.
At a high level of abstraction, the machinery of PCD has the following general features ( Figure 1 ): [31] [32] [33] [34] • There is a separation between signalling functions, which convey messages and execution functions, which terminate cells based on state information.
• There are different roles for signalling. Some signals trigger cell death, others signal permission to continue operation.
• Signals can be generated at any of 3 levels: • There is modularity in PCD design. Once a death signal is received by a cell from whatever source, a common internal mechanism executes the signal to die;
• There is redundancy in PCD design. Additional machinery exists external to the cell that can also terminate it. For example, if signals on its surface indicate that it appears to be dysfunctional, other specialized cells can destroy it (autophagy).
• There is variety in PCD design. Different classes of event trigger different pathways and mechanisms, and each class of cells may be regulated by a different bundle of pathways and mechanisms. If we take biology as our guide, then for an LHS to be adaptive, the capacity to learn and change practice must happen at multiple levels from the local to the global. Whilst there is no obvious organizational equivalent of a biological cell, we can still talk about an organizational "unit," which operationally is substitutable with another similar "chunk" In biology, rogue cells that fail to terminate can become cancerous. To minimise this risk, there is redundancy in design of PCD, so that if one mechanism fails, there is a good chance such cells will be caught by an alternate mechanism. In organizations, rogue units (such as a particular clinical practice) might also incorrectly persist and proliferate. POD thus requires backup mechanisms, just as with PCD, to police for such dysfunction. It should be possible within a digital infrastructure to monitor the process data generated by functional units to determine whether or not they are performing well.
| Programmatic organizational decommissioning
We should be checking to see whether they respond to decommission signals, and if they do not, remove them using an externally imposed mechanism. We can imagine software agents combing such a network, behaving like "cyber-immune" cells, checking digital entities for credentials of good health, as well as the digital footprints of physical entities. Failure to prove good health could trigger a central response.
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FIGURE 1 There are different control and execution pathways for programmed cell death including apoptosis, necrosis, and autophagy. These can be mapped into separate signalling and decommissioning mechanisms to manage unneeded functional units within an organization (however such units are defined). Separate signalling and execution mechanisms may exist at the level of whole of organization (macro), local external environment (meso), or internally to a unit (micro). Some signalling mechanisms share a common decommissioning process but may be external to a unit (extrinsic path) or within it (intrinsic path). Signals can tell a unit to continue functioning (+) or to decommission (−). Decommissioning machinery can sit outside a unit or within it.
Box 2: Programmatic organizational decommissioning
Simple examples of rules designed to trigger decommissioning mechanisms within or external to functional units:
• Micro: When new elements are added to data entry forms or computer screens, other elements will need to be retired to avoid increasing complexity and reducing functionality, eg, (Delete/Hide/Archive/Deprioritize) me if my (error/usage/incompleteness) rate puts me in the bottom 1% of elements.
• For a complex adaptive system, there is no learning without complementary forgetting. We thus need to move our conception of the LHS from one focussed just on learning, to one that also is expert at forgetting, from LHS 1 to LHS 2. Hopefully, by drawing inspiration from biology, we can design these socio-technical machines "to understand the process of design from within the system, to design a system that more or less designs itself" 36 
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